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| F-35A |
In December 2011, Japan picked Lockheed Martin’s new F-35A stealth
fighter as its next fighter aircraft, to replace its aging F-4 “Kai”
Phantom fleet. The F-35 was actually their 2nd choice.
Back in February 2006, Inside The Air Force (ITAF) reported that momentum was building within the USAF to sell the ultra-advanced F-22A Raptor abroad to trusted US allies, as a way of increasing numbers and production. Japan clearly wanted them, and the Raptor was a topic of diplomatic discussions in several venues, including a 2007 summit meeting. In the end, however, US politics denied export permission for downgraded export variants of the F-22, and its production line was terminated. That left Japan looking at other foreign “F-X” fighter options in the short term, while they considered a domestic stealth fighter design as their long-term project.
In the ensuing F-X competition, the F-35 Lightning II beat BAE’s Eurofighter Typhoon, as well as an upgraded F/A-18E Super Hornet from Boeing. Now Lockheed Martin has to deliver, and so will its Japanese partners. Will the F-35A’s price and program delays create problems in Japan? This article looks at the JASDF’s current force, its future options, and ongoing F-X developments.
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The JASDF: Structure & Choices
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| F-4EJ “Kai(zen)” |
The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) currently has 3 fighter jet models in its fleet: F-15J/F-15DJ Eagles, its F-4EJ “Kai” and RF-4EJ reconnaissance Phantom IIs, and the Mitsubishi F-2 – a larger, longer-range variant on the F-16C. The Mitsubishi F-1 entered service in 1978 and is still listed on the JASDF web site, but it has now been replaced by F-2s.
The JASDF introduced the F-4EJ in 1973, and it currently serves
mostly in anti-shipping and other “permitted strike roles, though it can
be used for air defense and policing. The RF-4EJ reconnaissance version
is slated for replacement by F-15Js with special pods.
Japan has indicated it will begin retiring the rest of the F-4 fleet
early in the 2010s, which gives the Japanese a number of choices to
make. The 2010 tsunami sharpened that urgency, by destroying 18 of
Japan’s F-2 fighters. Then China added its own impetus by unveiling its
J-20 stealth fighter prototype.
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| J-20 Prototype |
The original plan was for Japan to choose a future F-X fighter by the
end of 2011, buy about 50, and begin receiving them in 2016. That
decision was made,with a 42-plane contract in December 2011.
Meanwhile, Japanese industry is trying to figure out how to keep
itself busy now that license production of F-15 components and F-2s is
ending. The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies’ proposal involves
producing F-X fighters and their F-XX follow-on buy until 2028, and
having some of the 100-120 planes replace existing F-15Js as well. That
would be followed by a Japanese fighter design, to begin development by
2017 based in part on lessons learned from their ongoing ATD-X stealth
technology demonstrator. Japan hopes to fly ATD-X in 2014-2016, and the
SJAC’s idea was that its successor could enter production around 2028,
as the foreign-designed F-X fighter line closed down.
Japan has already produced F-15Js under license, and designed and
produced the Mitsubishi F-2 in conjunction with Lockheed Martin. The F-2
is larger than an F-16 and has more range, but its performance does not
compare to an F-15, and it costs nearly as much. The F-2s will not be built in expected numbers, which means they cannot replace the F-4EJs and RF-4EJs.
Given this impasse, the Japanese had several options.
The Winner: F-35 Lightning II
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| F-35A test flight |
If stealth is desired, Lockheed Martin’s plane is considered a
“second best” option to the F-22. While other contenders have sharply
reduced their radar signature when compared to planes like the F-16, the
F-35 is significantly ahead because it’s designed for stealth from the
outset, including internal weapon bays. As China moved to introduce its
own J-20 stealth fighter, that criterion seemed to eclipse all others in
Japan’s thinking. “Joint Strike Fighters” also offer exceptional
performance in the reconnaissance role, while its set partnership model
smooths technology transfer issues. Finally, the F-35 will be widely
used, offering commonality with key allies and ensuring a steady stream
of upgrades without requiring steady Japanese investment.
On the negative side, the F-35′s single-engine design would be a
concern during maritime combat air patrols, as it increases the odds of
having an engine issue cause the complete loss of the fighter. Beyond
that, the F-35′s industrial structure is largely set, its development
delays could make on-time deliveries a problem, any early deliveries
will cost well over $100 million per plane, and its declared status as a
strike fighter clashes somewhat with Japan’s avowedly defensive
posture.
Rising tensions in the area led Japan to conclude that it needed good
ground-attack capabilities as an explicit requirement, and based on
their mathematical analysis of submitted information, Japan concluded
that the F-35A was more capable all around than other fighters with a
proven record. The choice was announced in December 2011, and agreement
to buy up to 42 fighters was signed in June 2012.
Media reports aren’t completely precise, but they seem to suggest
that Japanese F-35As could eventually fly with up to 40% Japanese
manufactured content. Reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries Ltd. will be involved in work on aircraft bodies,
Mitsubishi Electric Corp. on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on
engines.
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DDH-181 Hyuga & USN’s
LHD-2, post-tsunami |
The F-35B’s STOVL (Short Take Off, Vertical Landing) capabilities
might make it an especially valuable future option, as a defensive
aircraft that could operate from dispersed land locations, rather than
bases that are easily targeted by enemy missiles.
It has a shorter range than other variants, but Japan is also
fielding 18DDH Hyuga Class helicopter carriers for roles like disaster
response, and will soon field larger 22DDH ships. They’re called
“helicopter destroyers,” because Japan is currently prohibited from
operating aircraft carriers, but it should be noted that other countries
are planning to operate F-35Bs from ships that are comparable to the
22DDHs.
This very fact may inhibit Japan from ordering the F-35B, despite its potential usefulness as a land-based fighter.
Japan had other options, too. They included:
Boeing: The Traditional Supplier
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| F-15Js |
Boeing and its predecessor firm McDonnell Douglas supplies the JASDF’s F-4s and F-15s. Their next-generation choices included:
Upgraded F-15s Japan could have chosen to go ahead
and buy “kaizen” F-15Js at a comparable cost, possibly with the AESA
APG-63v3 radar being fielded by Singapore. Additional capability boosts
would come from attached pods like ReeceLight or SHARP for reconnaissance, or combination recon/targeting pods like LITENING or Lockheed’s Sniper ATP.
The concern in Japan is that this option could leaves them without an
air-to-air advantage against current PLAAF SU-30MKK aircraft, let alone
potential future upgrades like the SU-35, or China’s J-20.
Boeing’s new F-15SE “Silent Eagle”
appeared to be aimed directly at these concerns. It adds a number of
important advances that will help it hold its own with currently-fielded
fighters, and is optimized for the kinds of long-range, over-water
combat patrols the JASDF requires. In full-stealth mode, its strike
capability is sufficiently secondary that it need not raise alarm bells,
while remaining useful in an emergency.
While a combined F-15 Kai/ F-15SE buy appeared to be the easiest
move, things did not work out that way. Boeing did not submit the
F-15SE, and F-15 upgrades will have to be a separate, future issue for
Japan. Instead, it submitted…
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| F-18 Super Hornet_International Road-map Concept lg |
F/A-18Ei Super Hornet. The base for Boeing’s
submission was the AN/APG-79 AESA radar equipped Block II model, and the
F/A-18F model has already been sold to Australia. The “Super Hornet
International Roadmap” is on the drawing board, adding improved radar
signature, the ability to carry weapons in low-RCS underwing pods,
better defensive systems, an advanced wide screen cockpit display, and
more fuel capacity without increasing drag.
The other Super Hornet option for Japan would be even more exotic.
Some of Australia’s Super Hornets are being fitted to receive electronic
warfare equipment, which would allow conversion to EA-18G signals
intercept and jamming fighters. That’s a unique capability, but Japan’s
avowedly defensive posture makes it much less useful to them than it is
to other countries.
Even with the EA-18G option, the Super Hornet was an odd choice in
some ways. Beyond the electronic attack role, it’s less capable than the
most current F-15 models, such as Singapore’s F-15SGs.
Its main benefits relative to the F-35 and European options ivolved a
low price in the $60 million range, the potential for significant
license-production in Japan, and future commonality with Japan’s main
defense partner, the US Navy.
Buy European
Eurofighter: Rising sun?
The Eurofighter Typhoon or Dassault Rafale were seen as possibilities, and coupling them with the MBDA Meteor long-range air-air missile
might have been very attractive, given Japan’s needs. Price is likely
to be somewhere between the Super Hornet and the F-35, and similar to
the option of buying more F-15s.
Dassault Aviation declined to participate with its Rafale, and Saab’s single-engine JAS-39 Gripen NG
wasn’t a contender, but Eurofighter campaigned hard. Their plane is a
very capable twin-engine air superiority aircraft. Tranche 1 versions
have very limited ground-attack capabilities that would satisfy
“defensive-only” criteria, while the latest “Tranche 3″ offers a basic
set of multi-role capabilities. The plane’s hosting of the long-range
Meteor missile, and integrated IRST system for finding even stealth
aircraft by their heat signatures, offer another pair of advantages over
American contenders.
The Super Hornet raised questions of comparative capability relative
to China’s new fighters, while industrial and technology sharing remain
issues for the F-35, so the Eurofighter had a chance. Their platform did
well, but Japan rated theoretical capability very highly, and their
desk-bound mathematical analysis hurt Eurofighter. The Typhoon was seen
as the most fuel-efficient plane, and its bid had the best industrial
benefits for Japan. On the other hand, EADS and BAE had trouble meeting
Japan’s purchase cost targets while giving Japanese firms all of that
work, and picking it would have meant deviating from Japan’s strongly
American industrial links and equipment infrastructure. That’s no small
move, in a society that sets such store by deep industrial
relationships.
What They Really Wanted: F-22s
No climbing Mt. Fuji
F-22J-EX. The F-22 was at the top of Japan’s wish list, due
to its unmatched aerial performance, high level of stealth, and
twin-engine design. In February 2006, a Lockheed Martin official
confirmed that a proposal to sell Japan F-22s in some form of downgraded
“international variant” was working its way through the Air Force with
the support of the Japanese government. At the time, it was “at the
three- or four-star level” and among civilian decision-makers. The
request has been pursued ever since at the highest levels.
Japan’s combination of long sea zones and growing rivalry with China make a long-range, twin-engine, supercruising and stealthy interceptor that has unprecedented reconnaissance capabilities
and leverages existing Japanese partnerships with Lockheed and Boeing
nearly irresistible. With it, Japan would have had unquestioned air
superiority over its territory for the foreseeable future.
There were also American advantages to a sale. The USAF originally
intended to buy 700-800 F-22 fighters, but that was cut to 442, then
381, and finally to just over 180. That left USAF planners concerned,
even as foreign projects like Russia & India’s PAK-FA/SU-50, and
China’s J-20, prepared to challenge US air superiority. If upgrades and
proliferation led to confirmed fighter overmatch against US aircraft
within the next decade, an active F-22 production line would have had
considerable strategic and financial value.
On the negative side, the F-22′s extensive and not fully-revealed
capabilities made many in the USA very nervous about exporting it, and
thereby risking a security breach around its electronic architecture,
stealth aspects, or next-generation data links. Licensed Japanese
production, a standard requirement for other Japanese fighter deals,
would be unlikely – or extremely limited if allowed. The aircraft’s
$137-160 million flyaway cost also makes all but the most serious buyers
hesitate, especially since a Japanese buy would require significant
changes to the plane’s electronics, adding significant development costs
on top. Some estimates placed the cost of an F-22J at around $250
million per plane.
Japan never had a chance to find out, as political moves within the
USA blocked all F-22 Raptor exports. It also left the USA to support its
shrunken fleet all by itself, which means financing a very expensive
set of electronics upgrades.
In the end, even Eurofighter’s better industrial offer and combat
record over Libya didn’t help. Neither did Boeing’s long-standing
relationships, the the face of an analysis where theoretical performance
trumped all. Lockheed Martin’s F-22EX was blocked, and so Japan was
left buying the F-35A.
Japan’s F-X: Contracts and Key Events
2013
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| Getting ready… |
March 25/13: Long-lead. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics
Co. in Fort Worth, TX receives a $40.2 million fixed-price-incentive
(firm-target), contract to provide long lead-time parts, materials and
components required for the delivery of 4 Japanese F-35As, as part of
Low Rate Initial Production Lot 8. See also June 29/12 entry.
Work will be performed in Fort Worth, TX, and is expected to be
complete in February 2014. All funds are committed immediately, and
this contract was not competitively procured by US Naval Air Systems
Command in Patuxent River, MD, who is acting as Japan’s agent through
the FMS process (N00019-13-C-0014).
Feb 15/13: Industrial. Jane’s
reports that Mitsubishi Electric Corporation is no longer banned from
bidding on Japanese military contracts, now that they’ve finished paying
the National Treasury back for previous overcharges in defense and
space contracts. The ban could have affected MEC’s planned involvement
in providing avionics and other products to Japan’s F-35A fighter
program.
2012
F-35A DSCA request and contract; How the F-35A won; The future of stealth debated.
Nov 9/12: Industrial. Japan may begin receiving
F-35As by 2016, but local industrial participation faces a number of
barriers, due to Japan’s 1967 arms export guidelines. Media reports say
that current plans to allow participation in the multinational project,
under amended arms export guidelines, wouldn’t lead to deliveries of
Japanese F-35A avionics, or of exportable parts for the main wings and
tails, before FY 2017.
Media reports are vague, but seem to indicate that Japanese F-35As
might eventually reach 40% domestically manufactured content. Japan Today | Yomiuri Shinbun.
Sept 6/12: Buy 4, for much more. More cost hikes for
Japan, as defense officials Defense Ministry officials cite “lower
production efficiency” as the reason its first 4 F-35As will be YEN 15.4
billion ($about 195 million) per plane and initial spares. The initial
budget was YEN 13.775 billion per plane for the first 4, which works out
to an 11.8% increase.
The ministry is trying to find the full YEN 30.8 billion for the FY
2013 budget request, in order to cover the 2 fighters in it. The Japan Times.
July 2012: Why the F-35 won. The Japanese Ministry of Defense releases its “Defense of Japan 2012”
White Paper. Among other things, it explains exactly why the F-35 won.
All 3 contenders fulfilled all mandatory requirements, but the F-35 was
rated as the overall winner based on the 2nd stage evaluation of
capability, industrial participation, cost, and support. It’s difficult
to tell whether the F-35A’s subsequent cost jumps would have changed
this evaluation, if they had been admitted at the time. Based on what
the government says it knew…
The F-35A was deemed to have the highest capability. This may seem
odd for a plane with no exercise experiences or operational history, but
the rating was done as a mathematical analysis, not a flyoff. Within
the inputs that Japan received and believed, the F-35A scored highest
overall, with a good balance of high scores across air interdiction,
weapons and targeting, electronic warfare capability, and stealth target
detection capability.
Eurofighter won the industrial participation segment with the highest
level of domestic participation, but had a harder time keeping its
local manufacturing proposals within Japan’s prescribed cost bracket.
The clear inference is that Japanese Eurofighters would have cost more
than other customers have paid.
The F/A-18E+ Super Hornet International was best for purchase cost,
while the Eurofighter Typhoon had the lowest expected fuel expenses. The
F-35A eked out a “Gilligan win” here by placing 2nd in both
sub-categories, and by avoiding the need for “renovation expenses.”
Japanese KC-767s don’t mount pod and drogue refueling systems, which is
what the Eurofighter and Super Hornet require. The Lightning II uses the
same dorsal aerial refueling system as existing JASDF fighters, which
avoids the need for KC-767 or C-130H refits.
In terms of support and maintenance costs, the F-35A was given the
highest score, due to its in-depth, fleet-wide ALIS maintenance and
diagnostic system. Having said that, all 3 contenders proposed
performance-based logistics (PBL) based on delivered availability, so
all 3 scored the same.
June 29/12: Buy 4, for more. Officials from Japan’s
defense ministry say that they have agreed to terms for their first 4
F-35As, despite a 9.1% price increase. The price hike was caused by
American cuts, which have shifted 179 aircraft out of the order book
over the next 5 years. The planes will reportedly cost 9.6 billion yen
(about $120 million) each over the entire buy, up from the original plan
of $110 million. American officials said they could not offer the
Japanese a lower price than other partnership nations. That makes the
Japanese contract a good bellwether for the real base cost of an F-35A
in the near future.
Fortunately for the Japanese, the overall contract remained at the expected YEN 60 billion (about $752.4 million). The cost of the 2 simulators and other equipment dropped to YEN 19.1 billion ($240.83 million) from the expected YEN 20.5 billion. Defense News | Fort Worth Star Telegram | Reuters.
Fortunately for the Japanese, the overall contract remained at the expected YEN 60 billion (about $752.4 million). The cost of the 2 simulators and other equipment dropped to YEN 19.1 billion ($240.83 million) from the expected YEN 20.5 billion. Defense News | Fort Worth Star Telegram | Reuters.
42 F-35As
May 1/12: F-35A DSCA request. May 1/12: The US DSCA
formally announces Japan’s official request for an initial set of 4
Lockheed Martin F-35As, with an option to buy another 38 and bring the
deal to 42 aircraft. “The Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s F-4 aircraft
will be decommissioned as F-35′s [sic] are added to the inventory.”
The aircraft would come with Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engines, and Japan would also want up to 5 spare engines. Other components of the deal would include Electronic Warfare Systems, Reprogramming Center support to keep those EW systems current, additional software development and integration, a fight trainer system for the F-35, other forms for personnel training & equipment, transport to Japan, ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) maintenance support systems, US government & contractor support that includes ALGS (Autonomic Logistics Global Support); and initial spare parts, technical data, tools & test equipment.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Japan involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, programs management, and training over a period of 15 years to conduct Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) and ALGS for after-aircraft delivery.
The estimated cost is $10 billion, which works out to $238.1 million per plane. Until a set of contracts are signed, it’s hard to split that accurately between purchase and support costs, and long support deals can add a lot to costs. Japan is also interested in considerably more local assembly than most of F-35 buyers, which is likely to add a number of unique costs of its own. Even so, the announcement has a ripple effect in Canada, where its huge cost per fighter draws a new round of questions about the plane. US DSCA | Canada’s Postmedia.
The aircraft would come with Pratt & Whitney’s F135 engines, and Japan would also want up to 5 spare engines. Other components of the deal would include Electronic Warfare Systems, Reprogramming Center support to keep those EW systems current, additional software development and integration, a fight trainer system for the F-35, other forms for personnel training & equipment, transport to Japan, ALIS (Autonomic Logistics Information System) maintenance support systems, US government & contractor support that includes ALGS (Autonomic Logistics Global Support); and initial spare parts, technical data, tools & test equipment.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require multiple trips to Japan involving U.S. Government and contractor representatives for technical reviews/support, programs management, and training over a period of 15 years to conduct Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS) and ALGS for after-aircraft delivery.
The estimated cost is $10 billion, which works out to $238.1 million per plane. Until a set of contracts are signed, it’s hard to split that accurately between purchase and support costs, and long support deals can add a lot to costs. Japan is also interested in considerably more local assembly than most of F-35 buyers, which is likely to add a number of unique costs of its own. Even so, the announcement has a ripple effect in Canada, where its huge cost per fighter draws a new round of questions about the plane. US DSCA | Canada’s Postmedia.
F-35 request
April 2/12: Stealth’s future? A Japan Today article goes straight to the main military point at stake: the future effectiveness of stealth technologies:
“As more nations develop stealth fighters, then the use of radar as the main target acquisition device will be taken over by infrared, wake tracking, electro-optics, and radio/electronic chatter detection – thereby side-stepping radar stealth features – in short order.”
It’s a bit more complex than that, especially given the fact that
stealth tends to be optimized for certain frequencies, so radars will
still play a role. Still, the falling cost of high-bandwidth networking,
and the need for a counter to stealth technologies, does suggest a
range of countermeasures over the coming decades.
Feb 22/12: Negotiations. Chief Cabinet Secretary
Osamu Fujimura conveys Japan’s determination to stick to agreed prices
and supply schedules for Japan’s F-35s, after Japan’s Sankei newspaper
cites unidentified US government officials as saying that Japan had
threatened to cancel its orders if prices climbed.
“When we were selecting the fighter, we asked those making the proposals to strictly observe their proposed prices and supply schedules. Japan has conveyed this to the US from time to time…”
The question is whether this matters. Once a contract is signed,
backing out becomes so difficult that for practical purposes, it’s
impossible unless the price increases are wildly egregious. The time to
back out is before any contract is signed. After that, the contract’s
own structure and penalties must serve as a government’s insurance. Reuters UK.
2011
F-35A chosen as F-X; F-35 technical issues; China unveils J-20 stealth fighter prototype. |
| F-35A: Winner |
“…of the four parameters [performance, cost, industrial,
and support], the most important was performance. When we think about
our national security needs for our future fighters, we have to consider
various security environments, and the movements and changes by various
countries. In view of this we need to have a fighter that is capable of
responding to these changing needs.”
The reported budget for Japan’s initial 4 planes is YEN 55.1 billion
(about $706 million, or $176.5 million per plane and initial spares).
Overall, the cost is expected to be YEN 9.9 billion (about $127 million)
per plane, with spares. On the industrial side, a final assembly and
checkout facility is expected in Japan, as well as work on components.
Reports and documents indicate that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.
will be involved in work on aircraft bodies, Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
on mission-related avionics, and IHI Corp. on engines. As F-4 replacements, the F-35As will have an air defense role, but Japan does have a large cadre of dedicated F-15Js to perform that mission. Note that there’s still an F-XX program in the future, aimed at replacing Japan’s F-15Js. Numbers as high as 100+ planes have been floated, but that will depend on both economic straits, and local geopolitical threats. Japan Ministry of Defense [ in Japanese] | Lockheed Martin | Pentagon | AFA Magazine | BBC | Bloomberg | The Diplomat: interview, and Flashpoints blog | Defense News | Gannett’s Navy Times | Reuters | UK’s Telegraph | Wahington Post | Yahoo!
F-35A wins
Dec 13/11: F-35 problems. The Fort Worth
Star-Telegram and POGO obtain an internal Pentagon “Quick Look Review”
dated Nov. 29, which says the F-35 is headed for serious technical
troubles. The overlap between testing and production has been a sore
point for the US GAO in particular, as significant changes due to
failures revealed in testing will require expensive retrofits of
produced fighters, along with the extra costs of changing future
production. Even as operational aircraft were being bought, from June
2010 – November 2011 there were 725 change requests for the fighter, of
which 577 are still not yet available to implement.
Major issues issues raised included unexpectedly severe shaking
(“buffet”) during high-speed maneuvers, problems with the helmet
system’s night vision display, and frequent failures of an important
electrical component that can knock out power and affect both oxygen and
cockpit pressurization. The team also expressed concern at the slow
progress in developing and testing the plane’s combat roles, including
“certain classified issues” that especially affect air defense
performance. Star-Telegram | POGO.org, incl. full Quick Look Review | Australia’s Herald Sun | The Hill.
Nov 4/11: Super Hornet International. Boeing continues to discuss Super Hornet International
designs. Not much has changed beyond earlier releases that noted
improved F414 EPE engines, a large touch-screen panel, warning systems
with 360 degree spherical coverage, and conformal fuel tanks to extend
range. They do mention that the dorsal conformal fuel tanks will have a
similar center of gravity to the aircraft, and that up to 3 weapon pods
would be able to carry 4 x AMRAAM/ 2 x 500 pound/ 1 x 2,000 pound bomb
each, while keeping the plane’s radar signature low. That’s in line with
earlier reports, which touted 2 x AMRAAMs and 2 x 500 pound JDAMs per
pod, but the 2,000 pound JDAM is new. So, too, is confirmation that the
new design would have additional radar shaping to lower its cross
section further.
With the Super Hornet out of contention in India, Japan appears to be
the main target, though the Super Hornet is also being marketed to
Brazil, Greece, Denmark, Kuwait, and Qatar, among others. Aviation Week.
Sept 26/11: F-X RFP submission deadline. Boeing
confirms that it’s offering the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet, which
has also been exported to Australia. Boeing also makes the
stealth-enhanced F-15SE design, but appears to have decided not to offer
it.
Eurofighter GmbH submits the Eurofighter Typhoon, with BAE acting in a
lead role. While the submission is described as “cost effective,” the
firm is not explicit regarding the status of the submitted aircraft:
new, or used.
Lockheed Martin is expected to submit the F-35A, but has made no announcement. Boeing | Eurofighter.
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Mitsubishi F-2s
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F-X RFP
March 2/11: Eurofighter. During high level visits,
British officials continue to press the case for the Eurofighter as
Japan’s future F-X fighter, over offerings from Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet or F-15SE Silent Eagle) or Lockheed Martin (F-35A/B/C). One
interesting wrinkle is that reconnaissance capabilities could become an
important requirement, a move that would give the F-35 family an edge.
BAE et. al. are fighting an uphill fight, but they’re not alone: in
January 2011, the European Business Council in Japan launched a defense
and security committee to promote defense-related business cooperation. Asahi Shimbun | Japan Times | L.A. Times.
Jan 18/11: China’s J-20. The Wall Street Journal reports that China’s unveiling of its J-20 stealth fighter has creates ripples in the region:
“Tom Burbage, general manager of the F-35 program for Lockheed Martin Corp., said Beijing’s progress in developing the J-20 has created a “stronger sense of urgency” throughout the Asian-Pacific region about air-force modernization. He said Japan, South Korea and Singapore are now engaged in bilateral discussions with U.S. government officials over the F-35… Mr. Burbage said the U.S. government has asked Lockheed to provide preliminary information on how it could build the Joint Strike Fighter with Japanese industrial input, building either major subcomponents or completing final assembly in Japan… on aircraft for its own military inventory.”
2008 – 2009
Efforts to buy the F-22 fail, Japan looks at other options. |
| F/A-18F over CV-63 |
Nov 23/09: F-35. In the wake of a FY 2010 American
defense budget that ended F-22 production, while maintaining the ban on
exporting the aircraft, Japan has been forced to look at other options.
Kyodo news agency reports that Japan is considering buying 40 F-35s, and
that the Japanese defense ministry is seeking fiscal allocation in the
2011 budget. According to media reports, the plane beat the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet,
F-15 Eagle variants, and EADS’ Eurofighter. The acquisition plan is
likely to be incorporated in new defense policy guidelines and a
medium-term defense plan to be adopted in December 2010.
The F-35s are estimated to cost YEN 9 billion (about $104 million)
each; that’s a rather low figure, when compared to actual expenditures
by the USA and Australia. If the reports are true, the critical question
would become: what model of F-35? The F-35C’s longer range might suit
Japan very well, while the F-35B’s ability to make use of highways and
helicopter carriers would add a very interesting wrinkle indeed. Japan Today | Agence France Presse | domain-b | Times of India.
Oct 4-7/09: F-35. The Japan Times reports, and
Jane’s confirms, that Japan is negotiating a requested payment of about
YEN 1 billion (around $11 million), in order to receive “sensitive”
information about the F-35′s capabilities. Japan wanted the F-22,
and is reportedly still considering it; the government is also
reportedly looking at the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault’s Rafale,
Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE, and its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The
Japan Times adds that:
“It is rare for a country to be charged such a large sum for information on potential imports of defense equipment. The U.S. also told Japan that Washington will not provide information on the F-35′s radar-evading capabilities until Tokyo makes a decision to purchase it, the sources said.”
One wonders about the wisdom of that sales approach, if true.
July 31/09: F-22. The US House passes “H.R. 3326: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010”
by a 400-30 vote. The final version strips out F-22 funding. As House
members prepare for negotiations with the Senate on a single, final bill
to send to the President, the amendment vote, and subsequent passage of
HR 3326, effectively marks the end of the F-22 program. F-22 production
will continue through remaining funded orders, and cease in 2011.
Both the House and Senate versions of the 2010 defense authorization bill require a report to study the potential for F-22A exports. The House version listed only Japan, while the Senate bill did not restrict the countries involved. Development work would be required before production, however, which creates real problems. While it’s theoretically possible to bridge that time gap by resurrecting the American program in future defense bills, the aircraft’s supply chain will stop producing certain parts, and begin losing the people associated with them, long before the final delivery in 2011. That makes a production line restart in 2013 or beyond a very difficult and expensive proposition for potential export customers like Japan. See also: Aero News.
Both the House and Senate versions of the 2010 defense authorization bill require a report to study the potential for F-22A exports. The House version listed only Japan, while the Senate bill did not restrict the countries involved. Development work would be required before production, however, which creates real problems. While it’s theoretically possible to bridge that time gap by resurrecting the American program in future defense bills, the aircraft’s supply chain will stop producing certain parts, and begin losing the people associated with them, long before the final delivery in 2011. That makes a production line restart in 2013 or beyond a very difficult and expensive proposition for potential export customers like Japan. See also: Aero News.
F-22 program ended
June 5/09: F-22. Reuters reports
that US Senate Appropriations Committee chair Senator Daniel Inouye
[D-HI], has sent sent letters on the F-22 issue to Japanese ambassador
Ichiro Fujisaki, and to American Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.
Inouye reportedly supports repeal of the 1998 “Obey Amendment” that bans
F-22 exports, and the USAF is also said to have decided to support
exports to select countries. Reuters adds that there is even growing
Congressional support to repeal the Obey Amendment in the face of North
Korea’s stepped-up belligerence, and the prospect of significant job
losses if F-22 production is closed per Gates’ FY 2010 budget. The exact
quote from one of their sources is “…decent support, but it’s not a
slam-dunk.”
The senator confirmed sending the letter, but would not discuss its
contents. Reuters claims that the letter conveyed some conclusions from a
recent USAF study, which placed the estimated cost of developing an
F-22 Export version at about $250 million per plane, assuming a
production run of 40-60 planes. The USAF study also reportedly assumed
that production of an F-22EX would begin in 4-5 years, with delivery
beginning in 7-9 years following a re-start of the F-22 production line.
That price tag is about $80-100 million above the cost of a
more-capable F-22A. It factors in average costs per plane for production
line restart, and for substituting and integrating replacements for
components that the USA still does not wish to export. The final cost
per plane could certainly end up being higher, if the development and
integration program runs over budget. It could also be lower, but only
if the substitution program meets projections and one of 2 things
happens: (1) The production line is not shut down, due to Congressional
appropriations over the next 3 years; and/or (2) More F-22EXs are bought
to spread out the F-22EX program’s development and restart costs, via
additional Japanese buys or by adding other countries as F-22EX
customers.
May 19/09: F-22. A Japan Times article looks at the barriers to F-22 fielding on the Japanese side of the equation, and concludes:
“In sum, Japan’s acquisition of the F-22 would involve significantly increasing defense spending, rethinking the domestic production of weapons platforms and implementing a more robust legal and enforcement framework to protect classified information. Under current circumstances, these developments are not in the cards.”
Given that some of the F-22′s material/manufacturing methods are
considered to be among its more sensitive technologies, domestic
manufacturing in Japan is unlikely to be an option at all.
April 6/09: F-22. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announces his recommendation to terminate F-22 orders at the end of FY 2009, leaving the USA with a fleet of 187 aircraft.
 |
| F-15SE unveiled |
March 17/09: F-15SE. Boeing unveils the F-15SE
“Silent Eagle,” which appears to be aimed directly at Japan. The
aircraft has slightly canted vertical tails to improve aerodynamics and
reduce weight, minimal additional radar shaping, the addition of
coatings to improve radar signature further, and a pair of conformal
fuel tanks with cut-in chambers for 2 air-to-air missiles each, or
air-to-ground weapons like the 500 pound JDAM and 250 pound GBU-39 Small
Diameter Bomb. The tanks would be swappable for traditional conformal
tanks if desired, and weapons could also be carried externally. BAE’s
DEWS electronic self-protection system would be fitted, along with
Raytheon’s AN/APG-63v3 radar that will equip all Singaporean F-15s and
be retrofitted to the American fleet.
The intent appears to be to offer a “budget Raptor” in the $120
million range, with a basic radar signature that’s competitive with
newer fighters like the similarly-priced Eurofighter Typhoon. Advantages
would include better radar signature when internal carriage is used for
long combat air patrols or limited precision strikes, a superior and
proven AESA radar, longer range, and more total carriage capacity if
necessary. On the flip side, it would not provide the same
maneuverability options as canard equipped contenders like EADS’
Eurofighter or Dassault’s Rafale. The total package would come closer to
parity with the SU-30MKI/M and subsequent versions of Sukhoi’s
offerings, but may or may not measure up against longer-term opponents
like Sukhoi’s PAK-FA or China’s J-XX. From Boeing’s release:
“Boeing has completed a conceptual prototype of the CFT internal-carriage concept, and plans to flight-test a prototype by the first quarter of 2010, including a live missile launch. The design, development, and test of this internal carriage system are available as a collaborative project with an international aerospace partner.”
That partner could also be Israel, which has now expressed interest in the F-15SE, and also made its own requests for F-22s.
Dec 28/08: F-22. Japan’s Daily Yomiuri newspaper
reports that the country is likely to drop its attempts to buy F-22s,
amid signs that U.S. President-elect Barack Obama’s new administration
may halt production of the aircraft.
Congress has yet to weigh in, however, and a consensus for continued
production could easily change the odds for exports as well.
Oct 10/08: Eurofighter. Flight International’s “Eurofighter gets serious about Japan’s F-X contest” discusses political developments:
“If you had asked me a year ago, I would have said that the Typhoon did not have a chance due to the close US-Japan ties. I am no longer sure of that,” says a Tokyo-based industry source close to the Japanese defence ministry. “Washington’s continued refusal to release information on the [Lockheed Martin] F-22 has strained bilateral defence ties, and Japanese politicians and bureaucrats are eyeing the Typhoon as a viable alternative to the other American fighters that are on offer.”
Flight International’s sources indicate that Japan will make one more
push in 2009, after the American elections. If that fails, it is likely
to abandon efforts to secure the F-22, and move to buy other options.
July 16/08: Eurofighter. BAE executives interviewed
at Farnborough discuss the Eurofighter’s opportunities with Japan if the
USA refuses to sell that country F-22EX fighters. BAE says that is
willing to share more of its technology with Japanese companies,
establishing Japan as a so-called home market where it manufactures and
sells products. Current BAE home markets include the U.K., the USA,
Australia, South Africa, Sweden, Saudi Arabia.
The executive also mentions that BAE is looking hard at India and
South Korea for future growth, adding that Defense spending in Korea
will be greater than in the U.K. within 5 years.
2006 – 2007
Japan pushes for F-22, but is undermined by pro-China interests; USAF F-22As deploy to Kadena, Japan. |
| F-22: Off to Kadena… |
“The F-22 is the Air Force’s new top-of-the-line fighter, far superior to any other fighter in the world in its agility, survivability and versatility. It’s so capable that policymakers aren’t inclined to export it, even to trusted allies like Japan. But does that really make sense if Raptor is the plane best suited to protecting the Japanese home islands against cruise-missile attack or preempting a ballistic-missile launch by North Korea? It sounds like Washington is saying it wants Japan to play a bigger role in regional security, but with inferior weapons — or that the Japanese will have to depend forever on America to do the really tough missions… if we really want the Japanese to be partners in regional security, we should be willing to trust them with other top systems too — especially since they’re the one ally we have that isn’t inclined to export weapons.”
July 24/07: F-22. Adm. Timothy Keating, commander of
U.S. Pacific Command, said he has recommended that the F-22 Raptor not
be sold to Japan. His comments came during a briefing at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and concern a new
U.S. “capabilities assessment group” of Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps,
Office of the Secretary of Defense and industry officials who are
reviewing Japan’s fighter requirement.
June 28/07: CRS on F-22. The US Congressional Research Service issues its report re: selling F-22EX aircraft to Japan
(last revised: July 2/07). The report itself is completely
non-committal, as it sketches out the options. While the USAF and
defense industry are solidly behind the idea as a way to keep the F-22
production line alive, there is some opposition in Congress. Key
paragraph:
“The executive branch proposes and Congress reviews arms sales on a case-by-case basis. The sale of F-22s to Japan raises both broad questions about the security environment in East Asia and questions that are specific to domestic interests. Factors that argue for a transfer include potential benefits to U.S. industry, contribution to the defense of allied countries, and promoting U.S. interoperability with those countries. Factors that argue against a particular arms transfer include the likelihood of technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability.”
Increased Chinese capabilities and the need for a longer-range,
twin-engine jet with the ability to take on modern SU-30 family jets is
mentioned in the report body, but the military capability drivers are
sidestepped and this is not highlighted as a key issue in favor. Japan’s
policy of domestic production and license-building is mentioned in the
document as a potential stumbling block, but it, too, is absent from the
summary paragraph. CRS reports also tend not to present
counter-arguments or responses to objections/contentions, as an attempt
to remain “above” political debate. That tendency is also present here,
and weakens the report as an analytical document. In a particularly
interesting side note, however, the CRS report adds:
“A final industrial base issue pertains to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Although originally intended to be complementary aircraft, F-22 and JSF capabilities, development, and production have converged. Implicitly if not explicitly, these aircraft are competing for scarce procurement funds. Extension of F-22 production would likely bring these aircraft into even sharper competition.”
May 23/07: Given the Raptor’s top secret status,
American trust in the purchasing country’s security levels and
intentions is a significant part of any export decision. Israel’s past
defense cooperation with China, for instance, which included sales like
“Harpy” anti-radar drones without timely US notification, has created
serious issues. It led to temporary suspension from Israel’s observer
status in the F-35 program, and is also widely seen as a serious
impediment to its current request for an export version of the F-22.
International espionage is a constant of international relations, and
victimization is assessed differently; but sufficiently serious leaks
can also have repercussions if they indicate a systemic problem, or
happen at a high enough level.
Details are sparse, so it’s difficult to assess the true importance
of recent developments in Japan. Reuters reports that classified data on
the USA’s AEGIS naval radar/combat system, SM-3 missiles, and Link 16
tactical data net had been “leaked” in Japan. Local media said
authorities believe that computer disks containing the classified data
were illegally copied and circulated among dozens of students and
instructors at a naval college in western Japan. The reports follow a
police raid on Saturday of a naval college in western Japan over a “leak
of data” in March 2007 when police found one of the disks at the home
of a Japanese naval officer in Kanagawa during a separate investigation
of his Chinese wife over her immigration status. AEGIS, SM-3 missiles,
and Link 16 are all key nodes in Japan’s outer layer of its initial ABM
defense system. Link from Taiwan’s China Post | Associated Press.
May 18/07: F-22. Bill Gertz, Washington Times:
“Pro-China officials in the White House and Pentagon are quietly
undermining Japan’s request to buy 50 advanced F-22 jet fighter-bombers,
to avoid upsetting Beijing’s government, according to U.S. officials
familiar with the dispute… Both the Air Force and the F-22 manufacturer,
Lockheed Martin Corp., favor building an export version… The F-22
export is a major test of U.S. support for Japan and is being watched
closely by Japanese government officials who are worried Washington will
not back Tokyo and instead kow-tow to Beijing on the sale.”
April 30/07: F-22. Japan applies to buy fighter Australia rejects. The USA’s stated willingness to consider Japan’s F-22EX request re-ignites controversy in Australia,
in the wake of the Australian government’s attempt to defuse the issue
by maintaining that the USA will not sell the F-22 abroad.
April 27/07: F-22. Japan has yet to receive clearance for F-22EX fighters, but discussions are progressing. South Korea’s Yonhap news agency: “Seoul eyes advanced jets beyond F-15K”
contends that the issue of F-22 exports to Japan will be under
discussion during the imminent summit between U.S. President George W.
Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The decision will be
watched closely by South Korea, which also wants 5th generation fighter
jets for its 3rd phase F-X purchase. An excerpt:
“China is modernizing its air force at a rapid pace,” said Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs at the White House National Security Council. “And so we are very positively disposed to talking to the Japanese about future-generation fighter aircraft.”
Japan has worked to improve its diplomatic and military relations
with the USA, stressing its reliability as an ally and collaborating on
sensitive technologies like missile defense. Hence the current
situation, in which exports of the F-22 can be discussed with some odds
of success. South Korea, which has made a very different set of choices,
is unlikely to be received as positively.
April 20/07: F-22. Flight International reports
that Israel has approached the USA about acquiring Lockheed Martin
F-22s, as concern mounts about new threats to the IAF’s regional air
superiority from proposed sales of advanced US weapons to the Gulf
states, and Israeli assessments of a growing threat from Iran. Sources
say that the issue was raised during a recent one-day trip by US defense
secretary Robert Gates to Israel.
While unrelated to the Japanese request, and very uncertain for reasons of its own, the Israeli request raises both the pressure to create an F-22EX version, and the perceived market & benefits from doing so.
Feb 17-18/07: F-22. Kadena Air Force Base (AFB),
Japan received 10 F-22A Raptors in the aircraft’s first overseas
deployment. The F-22As are assigned to the 27th Fighter Squadron at
Langley AFB, VA, and are under the command of Lt. Col. Wade Tolliver.
The aircraft started their deployment with a stop at Hickam AFB, Hawaii,
but a software issue affecting the aircraft’s navigation system
was discovered on February 11th, causing the aircraft to return to
Hickam. The issue was corrected and the aircraft continued on to Kadena.
The 27th FS deployed more than 250 Airmen to Kadena for the 90-120
day deployment, which is part of a regularly-scheduled U.S. Pacific
Command rotational assignment of aircraft to the Pacific.
Feb 11/07: F-22. The F-22A’s first foreign deployment, to Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) in Japan, runs into a serious problem. The aircraft started their deployment with a stop at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, but a software issue affecting the aircraft’s navigation system was discovered on February 11th, forcing the aircraft to return to Hickam without navigation or communications.
October 2006: wide spectrum of opinion in Australia
(including the opposition Labor Party) is also pushing for an F-22EX
request, based on arguments and strategic needs that are very similar to
Japan’s. At the moment, however, the current Liberal Party government
remains absolutely committed to the F-35A as its only future fighter
force option.
September 2006: DID’s “Japan Looking to Expand Missile Defense & Military Spending”
report looks at Japan’s current security situation, and
political-economic shifts that may be very consequential for its defense
market.
Feb 18/06: F-22. Inside Defense’s Air Force Plans to Sell F-22As to Allies offers a fuller discussion and analysis of Japan’s F-22 bid.
Footnotes
fn1. Reader Keith Jacobs informs DID that despite the JASDF listing of 7 F-1s in service, “The
JASDF marked retirement of the F.1 with a six-aircraft flypast at
Tsuiki Air Base (Kyushu) in 2006 (forgot actual date – but Feb or March
if I remember correctly. They were aircraft of the 6th Hiko-tai (the
final squadron unit). 6th Hiko-tai has now transitioned to F-2A and has
its full complement of aircraft of the new fighter. JASDF also retired
the last Fuji T-1B, assigned to the 5th Technical Training School and
dispersed them to museums (as they did the T.3) from Komaki Air Base. “ The date of that retirement at Tsuiki was March 6/06.
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